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WHO IS ZARATHUSTRA’S NIETZSCHE?
DAVID B. ALLISON
W ith the appearance of Thus Spoke Zarathustra and the work immediately following
that — particularly, in Book Five of The Gay Science and in the 1886 Prefaces to the
Second Edition of his works, there emerges a remarkably transformed sense of
Nietzsche’s own self-awareness, a turn, based on his own autocritique, that basically
works as a form of self-therapy — enabling him to grasp the really binding purchase
the social symbolic has on the individual. In submitting himself to this autocritique,
he first raises the question as to its possiblity, and then proceeds to effectuate it in
a rather complex manner. Ultimately, this opens the way for his finely detailed
metacritical works of the later period, especially, Beyond Good and Evil and On the
Genealogy of Morals.
Nietzsche’s Despair in Zarathustra: Personalization

In large part due to the self-consciously rhetorical import of his work, the reader of
Nietzsche is acutely aware that he is really attending to the witness, the testimony,
of a particular author, a particular thinker. And of course this complicates matters
of interpretation. Certainly, Nietzsche is the last philosopher who would hide
behind the cloak of anonymity or the authority of tradition. And while an author
may well introduce himself and his concerns in the prefaces to his works, this takes
on a rather roundabout itinerary in Nietzsche’s case — basically, his explicit selfdisclosure takes place in Zarathustra, and the articulation of this revelation really
occurs in the 1886 prefaces. As he wrote to Malwida von Meysenbug:
The long prefaces which I have found necessary for the new edition of my complete
works tell with a ruthless honesty some curious things about myself. W ith these I’ll
ward off “the many” once and for all... I’ve thrown out my hook to “the few”
instead, and even with them I’m prepared to be patient.1

Of course Nietzsche exhibits a preoccupation with himself early on, clearly
betraying a romantic, youthful bias, in his several autobiographical sketches, and his
early reflections on religion, fate, and free will. With his writings on culture by the
period of the Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche still writes under the influence of
Schopenhauer, stressing the role — and the suffering — of the genius, the purported
defender and savior of traditional culture — the “true” or “superior” culture — faced
with what he calls the “universalization” of culture, the “commercial culture”
fostered by state and industrial interests. Such an individual must suffer isolation
and personally carry the burden of cultural enlightenment. In the earliest accounts
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of this, such a burden is sustained by cultivating the Apollonian-Dionysian instincts
or drives — and this is most obvious in the Lugano Fragment of early 1871,2 and in
the lectures “On the Future of our Educational Institutions,” of late 1872.3 But a
striking change takes place with the revision of the Lugano Fragment into his essay
“The Greek State,” 4 whereby the rather romantic, metaphysically suffering
individual is seen not so much in some heroic, individual isolation, but rather as a product of the culture’s social and political dynamics. This cultural subjection is also
paralleled in his revision of the essay, “On Music and W ords,” 5 where Nietzsche
explains that the individual’s most intensely personal states of Dionysian ecstasy are
in fact induced by the actual performance of the dynamic musical spectacle. This emphasis on the cultural dynamic is also seen in his celebrated essay, “Homer’s
Contest,” 6 whereby it is the socially and politically orchestrated agon, that gives rise
to the unique strengths of classical Greek civilization, and to the individuals such
a culture produces. Clearly, it was Jacob Burckhardt who was behind this remarkable decentering shift in Nietzsche’s concerns, particularly Burckhardt’s lectures on
“The Agonal Age,” 7 lectures Burckhardt had been working on since as early as
1864, and which were the focus of his many extended conversations with Nietzsche.
In any case, it is the role of the agon, the contest or competition, that will, as it
were, put Nietzsche’s preoccupations with the individual per se, back in the box of the
social symbolic. And it is from this perspective of Burckhardt’s methodology of
cultural historiography, that Nietzsche will develop the broad outlines of cultural
analysis that stem from The Birth of Tragedy itself right to the end of his productive
writings. Already, in The Birth of Tragedy, we see his preoccupation with the Greek
cultural dynamics of the “tragic age,” the broad cultural motifs of the Apollonian and
Dionysian elements, the role of religious cult worship and celebrations, and finally,
the Socratic culture itself. “Homer’s Contest” sharpens the focus of the underlying
cultural dynamics, and the Untimely Meditations offers us several analyses of his
contemporary cultural milieu — perhaps most importantly, his scathing treatment
of David Strauss’ rational Christian theology. In The Use and Abuse of History, he
critiques the monumental and antiquarian “great men” historiography, and insists
on critically understanding what he calls “our historical horizon,” i.e., the whole set
of traditions, usage, codes, customs, values, social and cultural assumptions that
constitute our social symbolic order. It is this social symbolic order that will be
repeatedly articulated through his analyses of our religio-metaphysical tradition, as
the death of God and its aftermath, the morality of mores, and especially, slave
morality, with its remarkable power to induce and to structure our very affects
themselves so as to produce a culture of ressentiment, guilt, bad conscience,
asceticism, shame, etc., all pointing the way to his account of a seemingly inevitable
decadence and nihilism.
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W hile each of these concerns is treated to one degree or another in Human AllToo Human and Daybreak, they are perhaps best presented, collectively, in The Gay
Science, where Nietzsche carefully lays out a detailed account of the death of God —
his avatars of nationalism, modern science, the utilitarian ethics of sympathy and
pity, as well as nihilism — and the antidote of a de-deified nature, understood under
the formulation of the eternal return.
Now, in the first version of The Gay Science — i.e., the first four books, published
in 1882 — the penultimate section, §341, is the only one that deals with the eternal
return in any detail whatsoever, and it is only two brief paragraphs long. It poses
the question of whether one would be crushed or liberated by the “eternal hourglass
of existence.” 8 The preceding section — “The Dying Socrates” — clearly indicates
that Socrates was indeed crushed: Nietzsche recalls his dying remark, “O Crito, I
owe Asclepius a cock.” 9 The section before that, “Vita Femina,” celebrates what he
calls “the most powerful magic of life... A veil of beautiful possibilities, sparkling
with promise, resistance, bashfulness, mockery, pity, and seduction. Yes, life is a
woman.” 10 Since Nietzsche composed this in the presence of Lou Salomé, during
their retreat to Tautenburg in the early summer of 1882, we may assume that
Nietzsche, unlike Socrates, did not suffer life as a disease. The final section of the
1882 edition of The Gay Science has Zarathustra emerge from from his cave, bathed
in sunlight, to give his teaching about the eternal return, which will be his undergoing, or rather, his overcoming of the old morality, what he will call the “spirit of
gravity.” This final section, §342, of The Gay Science, is effectively the beginning of
“Zarathustra’s Prologue,” which will itself issue on the specific, and quite dramatic,
motif of one’s own self-overcoming, in Zarathustra’s first speech on “The Three
Metamorphoses.”
Given a life “sparkling with promise,” and presumably already in possession of
his own teaching, the question that arises, however, is precisely, “What is there to
overcome?” — for Zarathustra himself, who, after all, has left Plato’s cave, and,
much less, does this have anything to do with the person of Friedrich Nietzsche, who
seemed so blissfully happy in Tautenburg? In The Gay Science, the textual distance
between the eternal return and Zarathustra’s Prologue, presciently entitled “Incipit
Tragoedia,” is one section number, but between The Gay Science and Zarathustra’s
completion, there is a distance of some three years. What accounts for this distance?
W hat happened? Quite simply, Nietzsche’s world completely fell apart. His break
with W agner was sealed in stone by the spring of 1878, when W agner accused him
of suffering from an excessive preoccupation with onanism. This was revealed to
Nietzsche by his physician, Dr. Otto Eiser, who, as President of the Frankfurt
W agner Circle, also circulated W agner’s charge about Nietzsche’s alleged
misbehavior to the assembled festival celebrants at Bayreuth. Nietzsche was
humiliated, and forcibly had to remove himself from perhaps the single group of
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educated and cultivated figures with whom he would have enjoyed public contact
and recognition. But by the spring of 1882, he had met — and fallen passionately
in love with — Lou Salomé. At once he found the love of his life, to compensate for
his loneliness, and an intellectual peer, whom he also thought of as his closest
disciple. While she rejected his three marriage proposals, Nietzsche nonetheless
pursued her avidly, thinking their four weeks in Tautenburg, vacationing in a
country home secluded in the forest, would bring her around to his affections.
Unfortunately, she dropped Nietzsche for Paul Rée, who was infinitely more pliable
than Nietzsche, was emotionally stable — if somewhat dull at times — but who was
nonetheless wealthy: his family having extensive land and property holdings in
Pomerania and East Prussia. When Nietzsche met the two for an afternoon in
Leipzig, in October of 1882, he realized that all his hopes for Lou had been
irretrievably crushed. He never saw either of the two again, he was devastated by
what he thought was Rée’s deception, and he was cast completely alone, bereft of
any emotional or intellectual companionship whatsoever.
Now, many of Nietzsche’s letters from this three year period separating the
composition of The Gay Science, Books I-IV, and Book V — i.e., the period of
Zarathustra’s composition — present a remarkably personal, if not somewhat
strident, tone, and they offer a most unusual insight into the nature of Zarathustra
itself. In a letter to von Gersdorff, e.g., Nietzsche writes:
My Zarathustra ...will be sent to you within a few weeks. ... Don’t be put off by the
mythic style of the book: my entire philosophy is behind those homey and unusual
words, and I have never been more serious. It is a beginning at self-disclosure —
nothing more! I know perfectly well that there is no one alive who could write
anything like Zarathustra.11

Likewise, he writes Peter Gast: “It is incredibly full of detail which, because it is
drawn from what I’ve seen and suffered, only I can understand. Some pages seem
to be almost bleeding.” 12 In another note to Gast, he writes:
At the moment Zarathustra’s value is entirely personal... For everyone else, it is obscure, mysterious, and ridiculous. Heinrich von Stein (a splendid example of a man,
whose company has given me real pleasure) told me candidly that of said
Zarathustra, he understood “twelve sentences and no more.” I found that very
comforting.13

Initially, these remarks appear completely counterintuitive. W asn’t Zarathustra
precisely the most widely read, admired, and commented upon of all of Nietzsche’s
works? — in practically every language from Ural-Altaic to Urdu? Yet Nietzsche
seems to have held — even to the end — that Zarathustra was entirely personal, bred
from his own experience and suffering, and that it was a beginning at self-disclosure.
In fact, in Ecce Homo, he recounts the story of von Stein’s incomprehension, this time
claiming that von Stein didn’t understand even a single word of Zarathustra.14 In
any case, if one is thus provoked by the veritable eruption of Nietzsche’s personal
life into the text of Zarathustra, and one turns to the Nachlass from early 1882 to
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late 1885, one will quickly find a huge amount of personal detail therein. In fact,
the whole of the Lou affair is bared through tears, the years of ridicule from W agner, the final sense of W agner’s pitiable transformation into a fawning, repentant
Catholic in Parsifal, the devious deceptions and slights by W agner and Rée — it’s all
rehearsed in the Nachlass, and finds its expression in the text of Zarathustra — usually
encoded symbolically, figuratively. But more strikingly, what is really at work in
the Nachlass of the period is Nietzsche’s work of self-therapy, his working-through —
by writing-it-out — of his desperate sense of rejection, humiliation, and shame, the
memories of his earlier successes, which now burden him down, as well as the
memories of his lonely isolation, despair, impotence and frustration. And this whole
process of self-rehabilitation is orchestrated precisely according to the ini-tial
statements of Zarathustra’s three metamorphoses — the camel, lion, and child.
Just to give one case: in the Nachlass to Zarathustra, Nietzsche symbolically
works through his own despair, pitting a female protagonist — named “Pana” —
against the broken-hearted Zarathustra. Pana is the symbolic Lou Salomé who had
herself created the broken-hearted Nietzsche: so, through several drafts, Nietzsche
has Pana kill her own now-baleful creation, precisely the despairing, broken-hearted
Zarathustra, and in the last of several versions, Pana collapses in death because she
could not grasp the eternal return — which states that everything depends on one’s
own happiness, and that one must simply accept what happens, together with the
blessings this brings. Unable to grasp this “secret” of the eternal return, Pana dies,
broken by this simple truth, in despair and revenge. She takes her posthumous
revenge on the broken-hearted Zarathustra, however, when he dies of laughter at her
pitiful, suffering condition.15
There is an awful lot of dredging-up of painful personal material here, and he
recounts a remarkably detailed series of personal and interpersonal dynamics. But
it seems as if Nietzsche himself didn’t reach a satisfactory resolution in the text of
Zarathustra. Zarathustra’s self-overcoming is incomplete in that he never attains the
state of innocence, the third metamorphosis of the child. Rather, he stands accused
of, and indeed acknowledges, his final sin, namely, that of “pity for the higher man”
and wanders off once again with the lion — ever courageous, but not yet innocent,
at the very close of Part Four. 16 Even if Nietzsche worked through his intense
personal suffering, and really came to deal with it effectively, what ultimately
forecloses resolution in Zarathustra, is that he can’t overcome the memory content of
his previous states of elation and despair — both kinds of memories are instruments
of torture to him — and he simply cannot forget them, i.e., he cannot forget the “it
was,” the acceptance of which the eternal return was meant to accomplish. “The
child is innocence and forgetting”: not the Nietzsche of Zarathustra.
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Autocritique of M orality in the 1886 Prefaces and The Gay Science, V

W e know that Nietzsche contemplated writing another, final part to Zarathustra.
But he didn’t, probably for a variety of well-considered reasons. What he did do
was to resolve the third metamorphosis of Zarathustra in his immediately succeeding
works of 1886: Book Five of The Gay Science and his series of new prefaces to his
earlier works, for a second, collected edition, by his new publisher, Fritzsch. 17 In
these works of 1886, Nietzsche comes to realize that — as an individual — he was
himself constituted precisely by the elaborate system of cultural encoding, which he
had so insightfully described and criticized in his earlier work. He realizes that he,
too, was subject, as was everyone else, to the ethics of sympathy and pity, to the
elaborate moral and affective determination of his cultural milieu, governed by
2,000 years of Christian-priestly-ascetic values — not the very least of which was the
belief that love itself is redemptive, salvific. And, of course, this value tradition is
the very source of moral authority, the entire inherited series of “thou shalts” that
Zarathustra so labored to destroy.
Nietzsche’s turn, his Kehre, as it were, lies in his recognition that he must perform
an autocritique of the values, customs, traditionally sanctioned and sanctified
emotions and affects that constituted his very being. In short, that critique had to be
supplemented by a rigorous autocritique, and he states this necessity frequently in
the new Book Five of The Gay Science. Section § 380, “The wanderer speaks,” is
perhaps the most clearly expressed articulation of the real problem: the necessity of
being able to critique the very social symbolic order that governs one’s identity in
the first place. And in doing so, he borrows an analogy from Machiavelli’s preface
to The Prince:
If one would like to see our European morality for once as it looks from a distance,
and if one would like to measure it against other moralities, past and future, then
one has to proceed like a wanderer who wants to know how high the towers in a
town are: he leaves the town. “Thoughts concerning moral prejudices,” if they are
not meant to be prejudices about prejudices, presuppose a position outside morality,
some point beyond good and evil to which one has to rise, climb, or fly — and in the
present case, at least, a point beyond our good and evil, a freedom from everything
“European,” by which I mean the sum of the imperious value judgments that have
become part of our flesh and blood. That one wants to go precisely out there, may
be a minor madness... the question is whether one really can get up there. ...One
must have liberated oneself from many things that oppress, inhibit, hold down, and
make heavy precisely us Europeans today. The human being of such a beyond who
wants to behold the supreme measures of value of his time must first of all
“overcome” this time in himself — this is the test of his strength — and consequently
not only his time but also his prior aversion and contradiction against this time, his
18
suffering from this time, his un-timeliness, his romanticism.
The 1886 Prefaces to Human, All Too Human: Artifice and Autocritique

The cure for Nietzsche’s despondency and alienation begins with a ruse, a deception,
namely, with the creation of an imaginary interlocutor. Much as Descartes devised
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his “evil demon” to test the limits of his resolute reflection,19 so does Nietzsche say
that he “invented” a series of companions — sometimes called “free spirits,” or
“shadows,” or even “good Europeans” — with whom he could engage in a spirited
dialogue. And what motivated this — he says in the new 1886 Preface to Part One
of Human, All Too Human — was precisely his profound sense of isolation and
loneliness, and his need to be, at least at the outset, diverted away from his almost
obsessive preoccupation with it:
I had need of them at that time if I was to keep in good spirits while surrounded by
ills (sickness, solitude, unfamiliar places, torpor, inactivity): as brave companions and
familiars with whom one can laugh and chatter when one feels like laughing and
chattering, and whom one can send to the Devil when they become tedious — as
compensation for the friends I lacked.20

The products or results of these dialogues are, of course, his works, his books, his
notes of the period, whose content derived from his recognition of the causes and
origins of his own restrictions, inhibitions, and suffering — precisely what he had
been debating with his feigned interlocutor. The alterity — or otherness — of the
imaginary companion makes concrete the range of his own imagination: by
continually varying a perspective, by contradicting an initial judgment, or by
insistently prodding himself into recognizing a secondary or tertiary consequence
of a position. This imaginary exchange may take the form of a jest or a question,
as well: “Is that what you really believe?” “Is there a deeper motivation for you
saying that?” “Is that what you think, or is it what most people maintain?” Effectively, such a seriously maintained self-conscious dialogue serves as a critique of
beliefs, values, positions, explanations — and it raises underlying questions of
conditionality, legitimacy, verifiability, truth-functionality, agency, efficacity, etc.,
all of which are discussed repeatedly in Nietzsche’s “work” of the period, published
and unpublished.
W hat initially results from this discursive questioning in Nietzsche’s pursuit of
a “cure,” or a “self-overcoming,” is his discovery of the particular elements that bind
or restrict himself — and he finds these elements to be the causal agents, the
cohesive factors, that structure the morality of mores and define the individual as
such within the traditional system of morality. He terms these defining and determining elements “fetters,” and he claims that they serve to constitute normalcy
itself, one’s “home,” or one’s “being at home” — the regularity and normalcy of
convention, of all that is usual, familiar, and “day-to-day” in social life. He
enumerates those “fetters” which most palpably bond the individual not only to the
traditional order, but to his own personally experienced past, thereby preventing his
liberation. As he says in the new Preface to Human, All Too Human:
W hat fetters the fastest? What bonds are all but unbreakable? In the case of men
of a high and select kind they will be their duties: that reverence proper to youth,
that reserve before all that is honored and revered from of old, that gratitude for the
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soil out of which they have grown, for the hand which led them, for the holy place
where they learned to worship — their supreme moments themselves will fetter them
the fastest, lay upon them the most enduring obligation.21

It is upon conducting this intense and highly-focused experience of analyzing the
nature of his “fetters,” and of being able to critically articulate them — their
number, type, and range; their purchase upon himself and upon the culture at large
— that something personally dramatic occurs to Nietzsche. He is struck by the
feeling (literally, an emotional shock ) that many of these formerly revered duties,
values, obligations, and past memories are simply meaningless, nonsensical, absurd;
and that they merit little more than his honest contempt for their obtrusive
pettiness and small-mindedness. Once this emotionally-charged thought befalls
him, he realizes that he has himself changed, and this is the first step in his selfliberation. He can no longer hold these “fetters” in respect and esteem, and by this
very fact, they no longer bind him. What it was, formerly, to be “at home” is now
revealed to him under an entirely new sensibility — and this is felt as a new “drive”
or “impulse” — as unworthy of residence, indeed, they are felt to be contemptible:
“Better to die than to go on living here “ — thus responds the imperious voice and
temptation: and this “here,” this “at home” is everything it had hitherto loved.22

Nietzsche described the immediate effects of his new revelation as being twofold:
he experienced a practically intolerable feeling of shame for the loss brought about
by his obsessive inquisitiveness, his going to the utmost limits of his imagination to
understand his distress, and by doing so, to have lost the veneration and respect for
everything that until then, constituted belonging, identity, value, and honor —
everything worthy of love and worship. But this feeling of loss was tempered, then
overwhelmed, by a new feeling for the enormity of what he had accomplished, a
feeling of immense pride and personal exultation that it was possible at all, that his
contempt could overturn the very norms by whose agency he had previously
suffered. Thus, he was tempted, even dangerously, to test other norms, limits,
prescriptions, and proscriptions, to question what was formerly forbidden, and find
it delightful, joyous, the sweetest fruit. From this feeling of exhaltation and delight
there follows a determination to will and esteem, to evaluate, on one’s own account,
in one’s own name — and one leaves “home,” the “at home,” seeking to relish and to
develop the further capacity of self-determination, through new, multiply
transforming and overturning, valuations and estimations. Literally and figuratively,
for Nietzsche, this involves the determination to travel, to get beside himself,23 to
self-consciously seek other, strange, abodes and customs, other entire systems of
valuation, other realms of the human spirit itself: to be an “Argonaut of the ideal.” 24
Thus, one uses oneself as an experiment, as an open-ended source of experiences for
experiment 25 in the construction of one’s developing hierarchy of values — one’s own
considered construal of what really is important, what is significant, of worth and
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merit — what is worthy of admiration, affection, and esteem: again, in one’s own
name and in one’s own service.
At the same time, one progressively uncovers the truth of things, of people and
of events. By withholding the conventional value-positing perspective, the
prevailing mode of esteem or belief that enshrouds something, by “turning it
around,” one can uncover the distorting biases that contextualize and determine the
very significance, the symbolic “truth,” of things. And, gradually, they begin to
appear to a less biased eye as things yet unseen, marvelous in their complexity of
texture, their simplicity of intent, ever adaptable to the disposition of the observer
— mutable in their very disclosure. As Nietzsche says in the new Preface to Human,
All Too Human:
W ith a wicked laugh he turns round whatever he finds veiled and through some
sense of shame or other spared and pampered: he puts to the test what these things
look like when they are reversed. It is an act of willfulness and pleasure in
willfulness, if now he perhaps bestows his favor on that which has hitherto had a bad
reputation — if, full of inquisitiveness and the desire to tempt and experiment, he
creeps around the things most forbidden.26

Spurred on by the possibility that “all values” may be turned around, Nietzsche
says that he began to cultivate a curious sort of cynicism, thinking that the very
absolutes themselves may well have been little more than platitudes. This acquired
cynicism, and a certain irony attendant to it, provokes even further “wandering” and
testing of limits — until he is quite far afield, in “the desert” of his tempting
experiments. This “experimentalism” produces in him, Nietzsche says, a kind of
“solitude,” sometimes even a “morbid isolation,” but one that has gathered into
itself such a breadth of values and penetrating perspectives that he no longer feels
constrained at all — least of all by the old “fetters”:
One lives no longer in the fetters of love and hatred, without yes, without no, near
or far as one wishes...also [without] the quantum of stupidity that resides in
antitheses of values and the whole intellectual loss which every For, every Against
costs us. 27

Having broken these fetters, one has the feeling of a great elation, namely, “that
mature freedom of spirit which is equally self-mastery and discipline of the heart,
and permits access to many and contradictory modes of thought.” 28 Freed from “the
spirit of gravity,” and free to will one’s own “scale of values,” one is no longer
compelled by the old fetters or compelled to suffer from them. This sense of elation
or “weightlessness” one has attained, together with the fact that one has welcomed
so much — in gratifying one’s inner temptation to experiment with a plethora of
experiences — means that one returns from one’s desert transformed. One possesses
a generosity of spirit, an “inner spaciousness and indulgence,” such that everything
appears benign and innocent, drained of ominous portent and freed from malice of
intent. One gains the stability of one’s own power over one’s perspective, and this
at once liberates the individual from bitterness and recrimination while it places one
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above — at a distance, with a feeling of distance from 29 — the pettiness and
vindictiveness of others: rather, with a spirit of exuberance and freedom, in which
“curiosity is united with a tender contempt,” he remarks:
It again grows warmer around him, yellower, as it were; feeling and feeling for
others acquire depth, warm breezes of all kinds blow across him. It seems to him as
if his eyes are only now open to what is close at hand. He is astonished and sits silent:
where had he been? These close and closest things: how changed they seem! what
bloom and magic have they acquired! He looks back gratefully — grateful to his
wandering, to his hardness and self-alienation, to his viewing of far distances and
bird-like flights in cold heights. W hat a good thing he had not always stayed “at
home,” stayed “under his own roof” like a delicate apathetic loafer! He had been
beside himself: no doubt of that. Only now does he see himself — and what
surprises he experiences as he does so!30

Attaining such a state, such an attitude of mind, one is “cured,” as of a past
illness and a long convalescence, by the “Great Liberation.” And everything is
welcomed, without addition or loss, even “the necessary injustice...as inseparable
from life, life itself as conditioned by the sense of perspective and its injustice.” 31
Thus, finally having gained possession of his own self-mastery through controlling
his sense of perspective, having freed himself from bondage to the imperative of the
“thou shalt” — and the personal discontent caused by it — Nietzsche would reflect,
“You come to realize how you have given ear to the voice of nature, that nature
which rules the whole world through joy.” 32 Reviewing the joys that nature itself
bestows upon someone so “cured” as himself, Nietzsche ends the discussion of his
own “liberation” with a series of light-hearted “injunctions” — the last of which
affirms the resolution to Zarathustra’s paradoxical departure: smiling, strong as
bronze, accompanied by his laughing lion:
You shall... You shall... You shall... You shall — enough: from now on the free spirit
knows what “you shall” he has obeyed, and he also knows what he now can, what
only now he — may do...33
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